Fiscal and monetary policy framework have become increasingly popular as disenchantment with active stabilisation policy has increased. In order to maximise the gains in terms of welfare and output frameworks need to be designed to achieve targets efficiently and stabilise the volatility of the economy. We evaluate the current fiscal and monetary frameworks in the UK and the Euro Area, and suggest where they can be improved. The UK has notably worse productivity than the Euro Area, and the design of policy frameworks can be utilised to help remove this difference by promoting stability and raising investment. The UK economy went through major regime changes in the 1990s and as a result it has experienced more stable outcomes in the last few years. We evaluate the possible structure of outcomes if the UK remains outside EMU or becomes a member, and conclude that inflation, real interest rates and the level of government borrowing would be similar in both cases. However, it should be the case that further gains to stability and hence to potential productivity are available if the UK becomes a member of EMU. The UK and the Euro Area countries currently have economic cycles that are coherent, experiencing very similar cyclical positions. Although interest rates differ, it is clear that these small differences in rates have little impact on the cyclical position of these economies. In addition we find no evidence that output in the UK is excessively sensitive to changes in interest rates, at least when compared to the other large European countries.
Introduction
The Euro replaced the national currencies of the member states of the Euro Area on 1 st January 1999, with national notes and coin being superseded on 1 st January 2002.
In this paper we set out the background to the fiscal and monetary frameworks in the Euro Area. We then assess the performance of the UK economy in the recent past, looking in particular at changes in the stability of the macro-economic environment and in particular of the UK real exchange rate. Finally we discuss the question whether the UK economy is substantially out of line with the Euro Area either in terms of the state of its economic cycle or in terms of its sensitivity to interest rate movements.
Fiscal and Monetary Frameworks in the UK and the Euro Area a) Background: The Evolution of Monetary and Fiscal Arrangements in the European
Union.
Over the last twenty years both the economics profession and policy makers have gradually turned against discretionary monetary and fiscal policies aimed at fine tuning the economy. This is in part because the evidence on the effectiveness of fine tuning has been rather negative 1 , and even where it has worked, it has often been felt to be counterproductive in the medium term. Policy makers have turned increasingly to designing frameworks within which individuals can act with a degree of certainty about outcomes in the medium term. A commitment to rules within regimes is believed to be an important support for a more stable macro-economic environment. In this section we discuss the construction of the monetary and fiscal frameworks currently in place in Europe, and then we ask what countries may expect if their framework on average works.
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s led to numerous experiments with monetary regimes, and many were unsuccessful. Stabilising the economy using monetary policy was new, and the experience of the UK in particular was not good. The UK experimented with a floating exchange rate and active monetary and fiscal policies in the 1970s and 1980s where political pressures perhaps led to the overactive use of interest rates 2 . After some initial problems in the 1970s the majority of the members of the European Union succeeded in setting up the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1978 with the intention of stabilising bilateral rates between its members. Monetary policy in the ERM was set by the (politically independent) Bundesbank, whose remit was to maintain German price stability in the medium term 3 . The absence of political opportunism and interference in the policy process was seen to be successful, and this success was part of the backing for a wave of arguments for longer term commitment in setting policy.
The convergence of inflation and economic conditions amongst the ERM members was a slow process 4 , and realignments within the mechanism became slowly less common through the 1980s. The UK joined the ERM rather late, just as it was facing strains from German unification. The UK left the mechanism after the exchange rate crisis and devaluation of 1992, and did not seek to rejoin. Italy and Spain also suffered large devaluations in the early 1990s, but their commitment to the project remained unchanged. The Spaniards remained in the ERM despite their devaluation, and the Italians rejoined in 1996. The remaining members began to construct a new framework that was intended to lead to the formation of monetary union because they still felt that this would increase overall macroeconomic stability. Chart 1 shows the inflationary experience of the last thirty years.
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Both the UK and the Euro Area have moved toward medium term frameworks for both monetary and fiscal policy over the last decade, and they are intended to increase the stability of the economy by affecting expectations of future government actions. Individual decision makers are assured of a reasonable, or at least a predictable, response and hence can plan more easily. Over the last two decades economist have looked a great deal at expectations, and within this literature it is reasonable when assessing a regime to assume it is fully credible, and hence evaluate it on the assumption that on average it hits its targets. We would also argue that it is important in assessing the value of a framework to evaluate the variability of the outcomes 5 Although Britton (1991, p. 209) dates initial interest in fiscal frameworks in the United Kingdom to 1976, and the MTFS set fiscal objectives, but it is difficult to interpret these as the construction of a rule guided framework.
around the target. In particular we would suggest that a framework that increases macroeconomic stability, especially of any aggregates that affect decision making by economic agents, can be expected to increase the level of output and employment, and we should use these effects to judge frameworks.
b) UK and Euro Area Frameworks Compared
The departure of sterling from the ERM and the political difficulty associated with reentry meant that the UK needed to design its own monetary framework. Shortly after departure from the ERM, in late 1992 the UK adopted an inflation target. A panel of independent experts was set up to advise the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The creation of an independent Bank of England in 1997 was a continuation of that successful move 6 . The fiscal policy framework eventually adopted after the 1997 election was more innovative with a requirement that, over the cycle current income should equal or exceed current expenditure (the Golden Rule) and that public sector debt should not exceed 40% of GDP. The targets for deficits and debts that were meant to re-assure people that tax burdens would not be shifted over time, and that tax rates would not rise without a good reason. Both the monetary and fiscal frameworks have so far been relatively successful at least in fairly benign economic circumstances.
The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), a panel of independent experts appointed by the Chancellor and Bank of England officials, was set up at the same time as the Bank of England was made independent in May 1997. It reaches majority decisions on the setting of interest rates each month 7 . Decision making is independent, but the target for which the Committee aims is set by the Chancellor, and it can be changed by Parliament. If inflation deviates more than one percentage point from target the Governor of the Bank has to send a letter to the Chancellor explaining what is to be done to get back to target. The Bank sets itself the task of targeting inflation two years hence, and interest rate changes are made in relation to expected inflation as well as current information 8 . The process is transparent and accountable, but sometimes it is not clear why decisions have been made. More importantly it is difficult, within the rotating independent expert framework, to ascertain the MPC's response function, and 6 However, giving the Bank independence clearly increased the credibility of monetary policy, and inflation expectations as read from the difference between indexed and non-indexed government stocks, fell by half a point on the announcement. 7 The remit of the MPC is contained in HM Treasury (1997) 8 The distinction between expected inflation and current events is harder to draw than the Bank suggests, as Blake (2000) explains. The expectation of inflation can only be based on current information mediated by some model of inflation. If that model is wrong, and in particular if the economy reacts more quickly than the policy makers expect, targeting inflation two years hence may be destabilising.
hence expectation formation must be more fuzzy than under a system with a clear institutional response.
It is relatively clear that the current framework in the UK is working better than did the ones it replaced. The effect of the change in monetary regime in the UK can be seen in its effect on the inflation rate. Until 1993 (Chart 1) performance was poor by European standards, with the peaks of the 1980s exceeding those of most other European countries. Since 1993 it has been similar to that of the Euro Area countries.
The UK arrangements can be contrasted with the constitution of the ECB, which is more genuinely independent than are other Central Banks. The ECB remit is to maintain price stability in the medium term, and it is allowed its own interpretation of this objective. The Executive Committee meets and considers expert opinion, but its decision making process is not made public. The ECB is frequently criticised for this lack of transparency, but these comments may not be well founded. It is not always clear that greater transparency in decision making improves the certainty with which expectations are held. The Bank sets itself a target range of 0 to 2 percent inflation and its monthly decisions are discussed at a press conference and the President is questioned by the European Parliament. Over the last two years the ECB has been widely criticised both for allowing inflation to remain above its target and for not cutting rates enough in response to the slowdown in activity in the Euro Area.
However, if one group of critics were satisfied the other would become more vocal.
The UK fiscal framework is designed to allow space for government investment whilst keeping the debt stock within sensible bounds. Using the Golden Rule in combination with keeping debt below 40 percent of GDP is described as combining prudence with fairness. The intention that the government current account should be in balance or surplus over the cycle is meant to avoid constraint in any one year.
However, this in itself presents problems in ensuring prudence and fairness, as the beginning and end of the cycle have to be determined in order to assess the longer term fiscal stance. Both points are essentially arbitrary, and even with a clear description in terms of downturns etc, the end of the cycle must always be in the forecast period, not the past. A cynical government might be prepared to forecast the end of the cycle as the period in which it has met the rule. It follows that an independent means of assessing the cycle might be wise if the full benefits of the new system are to be achieved.
The UK framework also suffers from the weakness that no action is specified if the deficit target is not met over the cycle; by contrast the Governor of the Bank has to write a letter of explanation if the inflation target is missed. In consequence a failure to meet the fiscal rule might be taken to imply that the rule had been abandoned. At minimum it would be useful to impose on the Chancellor a statutory duty to explain to Parliament why the rule had been broken, and an independent, and responsible, fiscal authority setting or at least commenting on deficit targets might be a useful adjunct to this strategy 9
The Euro Area needs a clearer fiscal framework than does the UK in part because it is a new breed involving a number of sovereign states controlling fiscal policy within a monetary union, and there are no established patterns for such constitutional hybrids. As long as the ECB remains credible and firm minded there is little risk that a burgeoning of the debt stock would result in inflationary policies being used to erode the debt, but increasing debt remains a problem. If some of the independent fiscal authorities decide to 'free ride' on the low inflation strategy of the ECB debt stocks will rise, and this will push up the real interest rate in the Euro Area 10 , reducing the level of private sector investment and its productive capital stock. This would reduce the sustainable level of output in the economy unless the extra public sector borrowing had been used to finance investment that was very productive or had significant spillovers to the rest of the economy. There is little evidence that debt has in the past been issued solely for these purposes, and we should not expect it to happen in the future.
Fiscal frameworks with enforcement rules are important in the new constitutional framework in the Euro Area. However, flexibility in the face of economic shocks is also of value. While the Stability and Growth pact, in its original form does not provide any cyclical adjustment of the upper limit for government borrowing of 3% of GDP, it nevertheless has the scope to provide flexibility in a different way. No penalties are incurred until the deficit has been greater than 3 percent for 2 years without a good excuse based on slow growth 11 . This means that members can ignore temporary shocks to the deficit and concentrate on more permanent events; they should have the flexibility needed to cope with genuinely cyclical components to any deficits. If deficits persist for longer than two years then members face fines but these are staged, and are designed to induce changes in behaviour. It is nevertheless the case that the 3 percent target, like any fiscal target, is essentially arbitrary and is much easier for some countries to meet than for others. As a result although the structure and intentions of the Pact are good, it has not had a particularly easy beginning.
The problems the Pact has faced come from a combination of failures to consolidate fiscal policy during the recent upturn in France and Germany in particular 12 and the decision by the Commission to set targets that were perhaps too tight, and were not required by the Treaty of Amsterdam which set up the framework 13 . Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2002) argue that the Pact is transparent, and because it has clear penalties, it is credible, even though it is in need of a number of internal reforms. This view may be optimistic. There is clearly room to reform the Pact, and in particular to redefine the target deficits at its core. These were reinterpreted in July 2002 to allow potential Transition Economy members to borrow more to finance investment in their inadequate public sector infrastructure 14 if their public sector debts and pension liabilities were limited. It is nevertheless obvious that the Euro Area requires an enforceable pact with penalties to ensure that credibility, prudence and fairness are maintained in all countries in the Union and it would be wrong to assume that the UK alternative has no shortcomings of its own.
The monetary and fiscal frameworks in the UK and in the Euro Area are improvements on the structures that were in place a decade ago. Although they address problems differently, they have similar objectives, and similar targets. If the UK were to be outside EMU we might judge that on average inflation targeting would work and inflation would be around 2.5 percent, which is the centre of the target range. If the UK were inside EMU inflation would be similar, as the ECB sets a lower target for a slightly different concept of inflation 15 . If the UK were in EMU the fiscal stance would also be little affected, and as both fiscal systems adjust they are likely to converge. The UK wishes to borrow only to invest and this is a possible outcome of current discussions of changes to the SGP. There are penalties if targets are independently assessed to be missed consistently in EMU, and there is a case for moving to independent assessment and potential penalties of some form in the UK even if it remains outside EMU. Both systems are designed to keep borrowing in check, and if they do not they will be reformed to ensure that this objective is achieved. We can judge that borrowing and real interest rates would be similar whether the UK is in or out of EMU.
12 The tendency to treat strong revenues as indicators of good economic performance and poor revenues as the result of the economic cycle leads fiscal authorities to have a bias toward borrowing as Melitz (2000) argues.
13 Barrell and Pain (2001) discuss the complexities of the European fiscal constitution, and Barrell and Weale (2002) argue that fiscal policy has been on average used to reduce inflation in the Union as monetary policy is no longer available. 14 The final version of the well flagged set of proposals is in EC (2002) . It is clear that these proposals give space for the UK to fit into the fiscal framework without changing the fiscal stance. 15 See O'Donoghue and Wilkie (1998) for an explanation of why RPI(X) inflation exceeds HCPI inflation by 0.7 percent in the UK
The similarities that we might expect in outcomes for inflation and real interest rates do not mean that there is nothing to be gained or lost from being outside EMU. Although both sets of monetary and fiscal frameworks will probably work, they will have different impacts on the volatility of output and inflation around their targets. It is not obvious that the UK system is superior in terms of its ability to constrain these volatilities. The monetary framework in the UK may be clearer, but a two pillar system taking account of the price level as well as the inflation rate may produce more stable inflation. 16 Fiscal frameworks with clear penalties, as in the Euro Area, may be superior to one without them. Even if the UK framework were superior, it might still be better for the UK to join EMU, even as currently governed, because the gains from exchange rate stability might be larger than any that can be obtained by improving the UK framework when outside.
Recent Experience in the UK and the Euro Area a) Inflation and Growth
It is very difficult to judge performance over as short a period as the four years since the monetary union began especially if one wishes to look at the relative performance of economies that may be in different cyclical positions. However, we can draw some conclusions 'over the cycle' if we compare the most recent times the UK and the Euro Area were at capacity output and then fell clearly below it. This would date a full cycle as 1990q1 to 2001q2 in the UK and from 1991q2 to 2001q2 in the Euro Area.
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Over that period the UK grew at 2.2 percent per annum whilst the Euro Area grew at 2.1 percent per annum. Inflation averaged 3.2 per annum in the UK and 2.55 per annum in the Euro Area. We might conclude that UK performance was not bad, but it was not markedly superior to that of the Euro Area.
These figures perhaps underestimate the relative improvement in UK performance as inflation fell markedly in this period. From early 1993 the UK performed as well as the Euro Area on inflation (Chart 1) and better on growth, albeit after a deeper downturn. Labour market reforms helped support the change in the macro framework that began around this date. Low inflation was not bought at the price of particularly low growth, and by the end of the cycle unemployment was at a (genuinely) very low level. After 1997 there was a very major improvement in UK fiscal performance (Chart 2) which also appeared to have little influence on growth. This largely reflected tax revenues that were much more buoyant than had been anticipated, but tax takes were also raised markedly. There was a clear intention that even without strong revenues the fiscal situation had to change and that there should not be a deficit at that stage of the cycle. This change in fiscal stance accompanied a commitment to a medium term fiscal policy framework that was designed to keep debts within bounds. Public expenditure was not increased ahead of the 2001 election although promises were made to increase spending.
The performance of the Euro Area economy appears less good over the last four years than does that of the UK. The exchange rate weakened soon after the formation of EMU, and was perceived as undervalued. Inflation was consistently above target between 1999 and 2002, and fiscal policy was broadly expansionary before the top of the cycle was reached 18 . Although unemployment fell over this period in the Euro Area, it remained above what might be regarded as an acceptable level. In particular the German economy seemed to be performing rather more poorly than might have been expected even given the slowdown in world activity in the two years after 2000.
b) The State of the Cycle
Related to the issue of output growth is the question whether the cyclical time path of output in the UK has converged with that in the Euro Area. One of the Government requirements for UK membership of the Euro Area is that this should have happened.
There is a real concern about this test, whether full convergence might be expected to follow rather than precede membership of the Euro Area. However without such convergence it would be difficult for the UK to exist happily with Euro Area interest rates.
18 Barrell (2000) discusses the expansionary stance of the Euro Area's fiscal policy. The question of cyclical coherence is summarised by Massmann and Mitchell (2002) . We present here an update of only one of their measures, the deviation of output from a 21-quarter moving average as this is consistent with our volatility indicators. We extend the data period by using the National Institute's October 2002 forecast to produce moving average estimates up to 2003Q2.
Massmann and Mitchell drew attention to the fact that the cyclical dispersion of the UK from the rest of Europe was a question different from that of cyclical correlation. They showed that cyclical dispersion had declined sharply over the last decade but that correlations evaluated using a moving window up to 2000Q2 remained fairly low. This reflects in part the impact of minor idiosyncratic movements in GDP that affect the correlation of GDP series whilst not affecting the coherence of their movements. In Chart 3 we plot the cyclical dispersions for the United Kingdom and the other major European economies. It is clear that the cycles, as we have measured them, are closely correlated at least for the time being. The correlation between the states of the cycles in the UK and Germany is 0.74 over the period shown in Chart 3, and it is 0.67 with both France and Italy. 1986Q2 1987Q1 1987Q4 1988Q3 1989Q2 1990Q1 1990Q4 1991Q3 1992Q2 1993Q1 1993Q4 1994Q3 1995Q2 1996Q1 1996Q4 1997Q3 1998Q2 1999Q1 1999Q4 2000Q3 2001Q2 2002Q1 Germany France UK
c) Output Stability
The institutional changes we have seen in both the UK and the Euro Area were designed to improve macro economic performance and create a more stable economic environment for decision makers. Kneller and Young (2001) 
d) Productivity
These improvements in Britain's performance identified above have, however, not done much to improve on Britain's productivity level, refuting the popular notion that a good macro-economic framework would automatically improve productivity. Over much of the post war period the European economies were catching up with the USA, especially in terms of output per person hours 23 and by the 1990s West Germany and France, for instance had caught up with US levels of productivity. However, between 1989 and 1999 productivity in the UK, as measured by output per person hour, remained 10 percent below that of the Euro Area countries and there was no significant improvement over this decade. 19 With measures of volatility such as this there is always a worry that differences both between countries and over time may be a consequence of different measurement practices. 20 We use a relative standard filter, based on a centred moving average, with a relatively short period for calculating the mean squared error. This technique is repeated in the charts below. 21 It is important to note that the low level of volatility achieved just after the second quarter of 1997 is nothing to do with the election of a Labour government or the independence of the Bank of England that was announced in that quarter, but a reflection of policies adopted over the previous three years or more. It is of course of note that stability has been maintained. 22 We can draw few conclusions on the value of EMU membership the UK from the German example. Germany has lost monetary independence, unlike other members, and hence has some adjustment costs associated with EMU. The UK may face some of the same adjustment costs, but these are likely to be more than offset by the gains to be made from exchange rate stability. Germany has been benefiting from greater exchange rate stability for some time. 23 Output per capita is noticeably higher in the US than in Europe because participation rates are higher and hours per worker are also longer. These issues are discussed at length in O'Mahony (2002). There are many reasons why productivity differs between nations, and it is relatively clear that the Euro Area economies generally have more skilled workforces, and this raises productivity. They also have less flexible labour markets than the UK, and this in part offsets the productivity gains they get from greater skills. 24 . However, on O'Mahony's calculations, in 1999, the Euro Area countries had 29 percent more capital available per person hour worked than did the UK, and this is sufficient on its own to explain most of the labour productivity differential between the UK and its European partners 25 . It is possible that a more stable macro-economic environment could raise the level of the capital stock in the UK by encouraging investment and research and development activity. Byrne and Davis (2002) investigate the role of exchange rate uncertainty in determining the level of investment (and hence of the capital stock) in the major 7 economies 26 . They strengthen previous findings, and conclude that real exchange rate uncertainty, and perhaps also long term interest rate uncertainty have been the major (volatility related) factors affecting relative investment levels. They show that over the last 30 years the UK has experienced more uncertainty over the real exchange than either France or Germany. Their Garch based conditional estimates of real exchange rate uncertainty are plotted in Chart 4. These estimates cover the period from the end of the Bretton Woods era to the implementation of new fiscal and monetary regimes in the UK and in the Euro Area in the second half of the 1990s.
It is clear that individual firms in the UK would have faced more uncertainty over the relative prices of traded and non traded goods than would equivalent size firms with similar market orientations in France and Germany. As a result decision makers would have expected the future to be more uncertain in the UK, at least if they took on board evidence, than in France of Germany. Higher expected real exchange rate volatility will have resulted in lower levels of real investment and hence lower productivity.
Greater exchange rate certainty in France and German came in part from the decision to attempt to fix exchange rates in the ERM from 1978, but it also came from a greater stability in the operation of monetary and fiscal policies in the 1980s and 1990s. In order to support this judgement we can assess the contribution of domestic policy and the exchange rate to uncertainty using the nominal and real effective exchange rates. 27 We compare the volatility of the real and the nominal effective exchange rates for France, Germany, Italy and the UK in the 1980s and the 1990s in Table 2 . If the volatility of the real exchange rate exceeds that of the nominal rate then we can judge that relative inflation contributes to instability. This is the case for the UK in both periods, but not for the other countries. Lower nominal exchange rate volatility contributes to the stability of the real exchange rate, and in both periods France and Germany had lower nominal rate volatility than did the UK, as did Italy in the 1980s. Higher nominal exchange rate volatility in the UK could also have resulted from the attempt to run an independent monetary policy over most of these two periods. (2002) The stability of the macro environment should be judged mainly from changes in trade weighted real exchange rate stability. This reflects the uncertainty faced by firms in the UK that invest in productive capital, and as chart 5 shows over the first three years of the new regime in the UK, as judged by the volatility indicator in 2000, real exchange rate stability has been on average no lower than in the past 28 . By the end of 2001 there does seem to be evidence that the previous three years (from the formation of EMU) had seen a more stable real exchange rate environment for UK firms, but only at a level of the real exchange rate that may not be regarded as satisfactory. 26 They utilise panel data analysis on aggregate investment, and measure uncertainty using Garch based indicators of the relevant series. 27 We use NIESR exchange rates which use 1994 trade weights for both the nominal effective exchange rate and the consumer price based real effective exchange rate. See NIESR (2002) for details. 28 It is difficult to take moving average based measures of volatility much closer to the current date without polluting the estimates with a forecast of the price level, and hence we miss the currency instability in the middle of 2002. 1986Q2 1987Q1 1987Q4 1988Q3 1989Q2 1990Q1 1990Q4 1991Q3 1992Q2 1993Q1 1993Q4 1994Q3 1995Q2 1996Q1 1996Q4 1997Q3 1998Q2 1999Q1 1999Q4 2000Q3 2001Q2 France Germany UK
EMU and Exchange Rate Stability
Real exchange rate stability can be achieved by ensuring nominal exchange rate stability with major trading partners and competitors. The UK's major partners and competitors are clearly in Europe, as can be seen from the shares in trade in goods and services in Table 3 . During the late 1990s the US share in exports rose because growth in demand was relatively much stronger there, but even at its best it has only a third of the trade share with the current members of the Euro Area. Given these trade weights it would appear that the most efficient way to improve on performance from the last five years would be to increase the expected stability of the euro sterling exchange rate, even if that is at the expense of expected uncertainty in the dollar sterling rate. This would both increase general macro stability, and impact on the level of investment and output in the UK.
Independent monetary policy can be used to help stabilise inflation and output, but it is not likely that it can effectively stabilise the exchange rate as well. Shocks to the exchange rate can be driven by capital flows, and these will depend upon the composition of portfolios, and Taylor (2002) argues that the weight of portfolio related flows in sterling currency trades has a greater influence than they do in Euro Area flows. We should therefore expect that the volatility of the UK exchange rate is driven by factors not associated with trade in goods and services, but rather by portfolio related flows which are much more heavily oriented to the dollar. Given the scale of flows the task of designing a framework that is efficient at stabilising the volatility of a trade (and output) related exchange rate is likely to be harder for the UK on its own than for the Euro Area. The structure of gross income flows to and from the UK is heavily biased toward the dollar without the bulk of these flows having as much economic significance as trade and investment related incomes. Income flows mainly related to financial activity and asset stocks make up 32.5 percent of current account credits and 29.6 percent of debits. However, their net importance, especially when evaluating the costs of exchange rate volatility, is notably lower than this. We should net out well over a third of this as it is on matching, mainly dollar related, deposits and loans from financial institutions 29 . There is very little risk for the dollar transactions associated with dollar sterling exchange rate volatility, and they will not be affected by a change in this volatility.
A further third of the income flows in the current account are associated with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) either largely from US firms or in the US. It is not at all clear whether increases in exchange rate uncertainty raises or lowers stocks of FDI, as Pain (2002) discusses. Indeed, a fall in sterling dollar volatility matched by a rise in sterling volatility against the euro might discourage US FDI, much of which is aimed at the wider European market. Investors with the European market in mind would face greater volatility in these circumstances if the chose to locate in the UK and this might discourage them. Hence it is not clear whether greater dollar exchange rate certainty especially as compared to Euro Area uncertainty, has raised or lowered these flows in the last few years.
Many of the flows associated with incomes would either not be affected by dollar volatility, or are dominated by euro sterling volatility. The remaining flows of incomes are associated equities and bonds, and the relative allocation of these portfolios will be affected by relative currency volatilities, but their overall scale is likely to be unaffected. Changes in currency volatility would change all underlying stocks and hence income flows, but the effects on net incomes and the output of the economy would be very small.
The stability of exchange rates depends in part on the monetary targeting regime in place, as Blake and Byrne (2002) argue. They show that UK dollar exchange rate was less stable relative to that of the UK ERM rate during periods when the Bank of England was targeting the ERM or was part of it. The 1990s saw a period of monetary policy independence in the UK, and this has shown up as greater stability of the dollar sterling rate, as can be seen from Chart 6. This greater dollar related stability may be of use to sectors of the economy that are dependent on dollar sterling trades, and it is often seen as an advantage to the operations of financial institutions in the City of London. These operations mainly affect the capital account, and the net income flows associated with these transactions are significantly smaller than their importance in the capital account would suggest. 18 1985Q3 1986Q2 1987Q1 1987Q4 1988Q3 1989Q2 1990Q1 1990Q4 1991Q3 1992Q2 1993Q1 1993Q4 1994Q3 1995Q2 1996Q1 1996Q4 1997Q3 1998Q2 1999Q1 1999Q4 2000Q3 2001Q2 2002Q1 euro dollar rate sterling dollar rate
If governments are interested in the overall output of the economy when setting up policy frameworks it is clear that the factors affecting the volatility of trade in goods and services should be considered as much more important than those affecting income flows in the banking sector. Over the last few years the real exchange rate has become a little more stable, but this in part reflects dollar related stability. This is more of an advantage to traders in financial markets than to the rest of the economy, although it is clearly of value. Policies that increase the stability of the real exchange rate will increase the level of investment and ultimately the level of productivity in the economy. Given the pattern of transactions determining the level of output stabilising the volatility of the euro sterling rate is significantly more important than stabilising the volatility of the dollar sterling rate. It is difficult to scale the impact of EMU membership on the dollar volatility facing the UK. Barrell, Gottschalk and Hall (2003) utilise Garch volatilities for both rates and their estimates suggest that from 1996q1 to 2002q2 these were on average 25-30 percent higher for the Euro Area than the UK. These results are consistent with those in Chart 6 and suggest that membership of EMU would raise dollar volatility by a similar amount, and as a consequence would lead to noticeably lower (trade weighted) effective exchange rate volatility.
Is the UK Different: the Issue of Interest Rate Sensitivity
A separate concern from the relation between trade patterns and the effect of monetary union on exchange rate ability is the question whether the UK is more interest rate sensitive than are the countries of the existing Euro Area. It is widely believed that because of the importance of home ownership in the UK, combined with the preponderance of floating rate or short-term fixed-rate mortgages, demand in the UK is more sensitive to interest rate movements than is demand in existing Euro Area countries.
There is substantial literature on the subject. Roger and i'nt Veld (2003) use a theoretically coherent structural model of the European economies calibrated in part from micro-economic data sources to assess this issue. They conclude that amongst the four large European economies the GDP effect of a temporary interest rate change would be largest in Germany. This can be broken down into an 'average' effect on consumption (as a contribution to GDP) but a much stronger contribution to GDP from investment. Part of this is due to the larger share of investment in GDP in
Germany than in the other large countries. In contrast in their results after a temporary interest rate shock consumption in the UK was more effected than elsewhere, but the impact in investment was much smaller. However, in no case was the impact of a rise in interest rates of 1.0 percentage points for one year at all large. A change of this magnitude in the European Commission's Quest model used by Roger and in't Velt might reduce growth by 1/6 th to a quarter of a percentage point for up to two years, with little difference in the impacts across countries.
There are a number of other studies using macro models, albeit of a more disparate nature, as well as a raft of studies using the SVAR approach. The structural studies are surveyed in Guiso et al (1999) and in Angeloni et al (2002) , and both also survey the work to date on SVARs. Most SVAR studies conclude that differences between countries are not large, but Guiso et al suggest that the differences not particularly robust. The main regularities that seem to emerge suggest that monetary policy is at its most powerful in Germany, and in 4 out of 5 studies discussed in detail by Guisa et al the UK displays a weaker output response to monetary policy than does Germany, although it is generally stronger than that seen in France. BIS (1995) and Angeloni et al (2002) both survey the results from large macro models, in the latter case only for the Euro Area. In general the impact of monetary policy in these models exceeds that displayed in estimated VARs, and Germany shows a slightly stronger impact (and generally larger long run) effect on output from a monetary policy impulse than does the average of the other Euro Area countries. Angeloni et al also show that recent SVAR based evidence suggests a marked impact of monetary policy on Germany, and also on the Euro Area as a whole. We can conclude from these studies that the UK does not appear particularly different from , and in particular not more sensitive than, its neighbours.
We add to these studies our own analysis of interest rate and output volatility. We assume that the deviation of the economy from its trend output can be assumed to depend on the interest rate and on shocks to the economy. We assume that economies are subject to two types of uncorrelated shocks. Looking at the period as a whole, the United Kingdom shows median interest rate sensitivity, and Germany appears to be the most sensitive. In the first sub-period the UK's interest rate sensitivity is lower than in all the other countries except France, while in the second sub-period it is greater than in all the other countries except Germany. There are obviously many questions which can be raised about this very aggregate measure of interest rate volatility. However, a slightly more structural approach reported by the IMF (2002) comes up with similar conclusions. That study uses a three equation structural VAR approach to modelling the UK, the USA and Germany and finds that in the long run the UK and the US have similar scale impacts from real interest rates onto aggregate demand, although the short run effect is more marked in the UK. The long run sensitivity of demand to real interest rates in Germany is twice as high as that in the UK, although the impact effects are 25% higher in the latter country.
The framework we have used is obviously extremely simple but it confirms the pattern of the other studies we have referred to. In no country can we say that interest rates are a major and effective tool for short term demand management. Small movements in interest rates of 1.0 percentage points are likely to have little impact on demand, and the fact that interest rates are lower in the Euro Area than in the UK is of little immediate relevance for the evolution of either economy. In particular the minor differences in interest rate settings that we have seen in the first four years of the Euro are unlikely to have contributed much to the differential evolution of the economies. However, frameworks that ensure monetary stability can help ensure low inflation by assuring people that the volatility of inflation will remain low. The UK implemented such a framework in 1993, and the US and Germany had them in place because of their low inflation success over the previous decades. Hence the UK dos not look peculiar in terms of the overall effects of interest rates or in terms of the effects of interest rates in structural models.
Conclusions
Fiscal and monetary policy frameworks have become increasingly popular as disenchantment with active stabilisation policy has increased. Discretionary policy has seldom worked well, and has introduced a degree of uncertainty into expectation formation. Frameworks are often specified in terms of a limit on the deficit over the cycle or a range for the inflation rate. However, the design of frameworks has to take account of the determination of the level of output in the economy. Changes in the volatility of economic variables can change risk premia and hence economic decisions. In particular the risk premia taken into account when making investment decisions are important in determining the level of output. In order to maximise the gains in terms of welfare and output, frameworks need to be designed to achieve targets efficiently and stabilise the volatility of the economy, and in particular the determinants of investment risk premia.
We evaluate the current fiscal and monetary frameworks in the UK and the Euro Area, and suggest where they can be improved, both in terms of their credibility (and enforceability) and in their impact on volatilities. Reducing the volatility of economic outcomes in the UK could have a major impact on productivity. The UK has notably worse productivity than the Euro Area, and the design of policy frameworks can be utilised to help remove this difference by promoting stability and raising investment.
Some progress in this direction has already been made. The UK economy went through major regime changes in the 1990s, starting with inflation targeting, and strengthened with the independence of the Bank of England and the introduction of a clearer fiscal targeting regime in 1997 and 1998. As a result it appears that the UK has begun to experience more stable outcomes, especially for output and the real effective exchange rate, in the last few years. If these are sustained, and especially if the stability of the real effective exchange can be maintained, investment is likely to be higher and part of the productivity gap with the Euro Area may eventually be removed.
It is important to evaluate the possible structure of outcomes if the UK remains outside EMU or becomes a member. We conclude that inflation, real interest rates and the level of government borrowing would be similar in both cases, especially if targeting regimes are effectively operated. However, it should be the case that further gains to stability and hence to potential productivity are available if the UK becomes a member of EMU. In particular, UK trade in goods and services is much more heavily oriented to euro related trades than are current account transactions in general. Hence stabilising the volatility of the trade related real effective exchange rate against the Euro Area is more important for productivity enhancement than stabilising the volatility of the dollar rate.
The UK has operated an independent monetary policy since the formation of EMU. This clearly has advantages for short term stabilisation of the economy if the cyclical position of the UK were to be different from that of the Euro Area. It would also be an advantage if the UK reacted in a significantly different way in response to interest rates. The UK and the Euro Area countries currently have economic cycles that are coherent, experiencing very similar cyclical positions. Although interest rates differ, it is clear that these small differences in rates have little impact on the cyclical position of these economies. In addition the evidence we present indicates that output in the UK does not experience excess sensitivity to changes in interest rates, at least when compared to the other large European countries.
The UK has changed its macroeconomic framework in the last 6 to 10 years, and partly as a result it has begun to reap some benefits. The economy appears more stable than it did, and the prospects look better. However, whilst the exchange rate against the euro remains potentially volatile significant risks remain, especially to activity and output in the more open sectors of the economy.
